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Abstract
This paper deals with the forest owner’s attitude towards risk and the harvesting decision
in several ways. First, we propose to characterize and quantify the forest owner’s attitude to-
wards risk. Second, we analyze the determinants of the forest owner’s risk attitude. Finally, we
determine the impact of the forest owner’s risk attitude on the harvesting decision. The French
forest owner’s risk attitude is tackled by implementing a questionnaire, including a context-free
measure borrowed from experimental economics. The determinants of the forest owner’s risk at-
titude and harvesting decision are estimated through a recursive bivariate ordered probit model.
We show that French forest owners are characterized by a relative risk aversion coefficient close
to 1. In addition, we found that the forest owner’s risk aversion is influenced positively and
significantly by gender (female), age, and willingness to protect the environment, while the
percentage of forest income in the total patrimony of the forest owner has a negative effect.
Finally, we obtain that the forest owner’s risk aversion positively and significantly impacts the
harvesting decision.
Keywords: Forest owner’s risk attitude; Risk aversion; Harvesting decision.
JEL classification: D81, C35, Q23
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1 Introduction
Climate change leads countries to think about alternatives to fossil fuels. Indeed, the European
Union has decided to reduce its GHG emissions by 20% until 2020 and to divide these emissions by
four by 2050 (compared to the 1990 level). To reach this objective, the European Union has pro-
posed a 20% increase in the proportion of renewable energies in the Union’s overall energy balance.
In France, decision makers have proposed to improve energy efficiency by 20% and, especially, to
increase the proportion of renewable energies in its energy balance from 12% (in 2006) to at least
23% in 2020, along with developing the uses of wood materials.
In such a context, forest biomass appears at the heart of the debate. Indeed, timber has a neu-
tral impact on GHG and is a renewable and ecological raw material. Therefore, France has decided
to increase harvesting in its forests by 21 million cubic meters until 2020.1 IGN [18] estimates that,
in France, the timber volume increased by around 44.8 million cubic meters each year during the
period 2006-2010, so that the target set by France seems to be achievable, in theory. However,
several potential obstacles can be identified. First, in France, private forests represent 75% of the
forest area, so that the mobilization effort comes to bear mainly on private forest owners. More-
over, French forest private ownership is highly fragmented with 3.5 million private forest owners
and an average area of around 8.8 hectares. Such observations raise many questions in terms of the
feasibility of the French objective, both in terms of the efficiency of small-scale forest management,
and in terms of incentives for private forest owners to harvest. Second, although the forest biomass
helps fight climate change, it is also sensitive to increasing temperature, water stress, and increases
in the frequency and/or intensity of natural hazards, so that uncertainty characterizes the private
forest owners’ harvesting decision, and the attitude of owners towards this uncertainty may play a
significant role. Consequently, better knowledge of the determinants of private forest owners har-
vesting decision seems to be relevant. In particular, a focus on the effect of attitude towards risk
on the harvesting decision is of special interest.
Investigating the determinants of private forest owners’ harvesting decisions leads to numerous
papers focusing on the role of non-timber activities (Conway et al. [8]; Pattanayak et al. [29]),
bequest motives and debt (Conway et al. [8]), distribution of forest capital (Pattanayak et al. [30]),
personal socio-economic characteristics, mainly the level of forest income and non-forest income of
owners (Stordal et al. [33]), and social interactions (Garcia et al. [12]). However, to our knowledge
1“Grenelle de l’environnement” in 2007 and “Assises de la forêt” in 2007-2008.
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none of these studies consider the forest owner’s risk attitude as a potential explanatory variable
for harvesting decisions.
In parallel, many theoretical papers study the impact of the forest owners’ risk attitude on
various types of decisions, such as rotation length (Alvarez and Koskela [1]; Clarke and Reed [7];
Gong and Löfgren [14]; Uusivuori [34]), forest investments (Kangas [20]), forest owners’ consump-
tion (Koskela [21]) and decision to replant or not after a clear cutting (Lien et al. [24]), but not on
the harvesting decision. In addition, some empirical studies try to characterize the forest owner’s
risk attitude through telephone interviews (Lönnstedt and Svensson [25]), mail surveys (Andersson
and Gong [3]), or field experiment (Brunette et al. [5]). However, these studies obtain different re-
sults. Lönnstedt and Svensson [25] found risk-prone attitudes in the case of low monetary amounts,
yet risk-averse attitudes when large amounts were at stake. Andersson and Gong [3] find that a
majority of forest owners were risk-neutral or risk-prone. Brunette et al. [5] concluded that forest
owners are risk averse. These empirical works do not try to evaluate the forest owner’s risk attitude,
nor do they analyze the determinants of the forest owner’s risk attitude and the impact of the forest
owner’s risk attitude on the harvesting decision.
In this context, we propose i) to characterize the forest owner’s attitude towards risk; ii) to
analyze the determinants of the forest owner’s risk attitude; and iii) to determine the impact of
the forest owner’s risk attitude (and other exogenous variables as well) on the harvesting decision.
For this purpose, we assess the French forest owner’s risk attitude by means of a questionnaire,
using a context-free measure borrowed from experimental economics (Eckel and Grossman [11]).
The determinants of the forest owner’s risk attitude and harvesting decision are estimated through
a recursive bivariate ordered probit model. We show that French forest owners are characterized by
a relative risk aversion coefficient close to 1. In addition, we found that the forest owner’s risk aver-
sion is influenced positively and significantly by gender (female), age, and willingness to protect the
environment, while the percentage of forest income in the total patrimony of the forest owner has a
negative effect. Finally, we obtain that the forest owner’s risk aversion positively and significantly
impacts the harvesting decision.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the data. Section 3 presents
the econometric model. Section 4 presents the results. Section 5 discusses the results and concludes.
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2 Data
2.1 The measurement of risk attitude
In this paper, we want to provide a measure of non-industrial private forest (NIPF) owners’ attitude
towards risk that is context-independent, so we turn to experimental economics. Indeed, experi-
mental economics is often used to elicit individual risk attitude, both in the lab and in the field. In
experimental economics, two procedures are well known: the “Multiple Price List” method of Holt
and Laury [15] and the procedure of Eckel and Grossman [11]. We adopt the second procedure for
two major reasons. First, in the procedure of Eckel and Grossman [11], the measurement of risk
attitude bears on only one lottery choice, while the Holt and Laury [15] method implies ten lottery
choices. Furthermore, this lottery task is only a brief part of a longer survey, so we think that a
shorter elicitation procedure makes the forest owner’s answers more likely. Second, the procedure
of Eckel and Grossman [11] has already been used to elicit French farmers’ attitude (Couture and
Reynaud [9]).
In the procedure of Eckel and Grossman [11], the subject must choose one gamble that she/he
accepts to participate in among five possible ones. This choice allows the researcher to infer risk
aversion and risk neutrality but not risk-prone behavior. Then, Couture and Reynaud [9] extends
the procedure of Eckel and Grossman [11] to risk-prone attitudes. The subject must now choose
the gamble she/he accepts out of nine options. We assume that individuals have a power utility
function, which in turn implies Decreasing Absolute Risk Aversion (DARA), a standard assumption
in the literature (Gollier [13]). Table 1 presents the procedure of Couture and Reynaud [9].
Table 1: Procedure of Couture and Reynaud [9]
Choice 50/50 gamble Payoff 1 Payoff 2 CRRA ranges CRRA code
Gamble 1 40 40 r > 1.37 RA5
Gamble 2 32 51 0.68 < r < 1.37 RA4
Gamble 3 24 64 0.44 < r < 0.68 RA3
Gamble 4 16 78 0.4 < r < 0.44 RA2
Gamble 5 12 86 0.15 < r < 0.4 RA1
Gamble 6 8 91.5 -0.13 < r < 0.15 RN
Gamble 7 6 92.9 -0.47 < r < -0.13 RP1
Gamble 8 4 93.4 -0.93 < r < -0.47 RP2
Gamble 9 1 93.5 r < -0.93 RP3
This table presents the nine gambles available to our sample of private forest owners. Each
gamble provides payoff 1 and 2 with an equal probability of 50%. Then, the choice of gamble 1
ensures a gain of 40 euros, corresponding to a Coefficient of Relative Risk Aversion (CRRA) of r >
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1.37, i.e. extreme risk-aversion (RA5). Risk Neutrality (RN) appeared with the choice of gamble
6, while the choice of gambles 7, 8 or 9 characterizes risk-prone (RP) behaviors from RP1, low
risk-prone attitude, to RP3, high risk-prone attitude.
The procedure here is used without financial incentives, i.e. gains are purely hypothetical.
However, as indicated by Camerer and Hogarth [6], when subjects have to make simple tasks
such as choices between lotteries, financial incentives do not seem to significantly affect the results.
Moreover, the survey is based on voluntary participation such that we can assume that forest owners
reveal their true preferences.
2.2 Descriptive statistics
The data come from a survey implemented to analyze the capacity of wood mobilization in France,
in the context of the European project Newforex.
The questionnaire was sent to French private forest owners in five regions with different chal-
lenges and forest dynamics: Bourgogne, Pays de la Loire, Auvergne, Lorraine, and Provence-Alpes-
Côte-d’Azur. Indeed, they have different rates of forest cover (more than 45% in Lorraine compared
to less than 15% in Pays de la Loire) and different proportions of private forest (more than 50%
public forests in Lorraine compared to less than 20% in Pays de la Loire, Auvergne, and Bougogne).
In France, the size of properties may be very different (more than 2 million properties are less
than 1 ha and nearly 10,000 properties are over 100 ha), so we stratified the sample by size class in
each region. We then randomly selected owners from each stratum. The sample was drawn from
the database of the association of French private forest owners.
The questionnaire was sent by mail and 590 questionnaires were completed. Among these 590
questionnaires, 324 were usable for our study.
The questionnaire was composed of three different parts: 1) the forest property; 2) wood pro-
duction; and 3) the forest owners. Table 2 displays descriptive statistics of the variables used in the
estimation stage.
Forest property. The average forest area in the database is 65 hectares, which is quite high since
the average area among private forest owners in France is 8.8 hectares. This suggests that the forest
owners in our sample have an economic interest in forest management and are interested in the
question of wood mobilization. We can also observe that forest income represents on average 4.15%
in the forest owners’ total wealth and that 15% of the owners delegate the management of the forest
property to a professional. Finally, Table 2 reveals that 18% of the forest properties are located in
the region Lorraine, 17% in Auvergne, 14% in Provence-Alpes-Côte-d’Azur (PACA), 28% in Pays
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de la Loire (PDL) and 21% in Bourgogne.
Table 2: Definitions and descriptive statistics
Variable Definition Mean Std. Err.
HARVEST Binary variable = 1 if timber was harvested over the
past five years
0.61 0.48
ENVIRON Binary variable = 1 if the owner intends to perform
work with its neighbors to protect the environment
0.08 0.27
AREA Forest area of the property (in ha) 65.93 140.93
GENDER Binary variable = 1 if owner is a woman 0.16 0.37
PRICE Average regional price (in e) 55.28 6.54
AGE Age (years) 63.86 12.11
FOREST-INCOME Percentage of forest income 4.15 12.11
LEISURE Binary variable = 1 if the owner or members of
her/his family have leisure activities in the forest
0.22 0.42
BEQUEST Binary variable = 1 if the owner intends to bequeath
her/his forest
0.54 0.50
DELEGATION Binary variable = 1 if the owner delegates the man-
agement of her/his property to a professional (ex-
pert)
0.15 0.36
FORESTER Binary variable = 1 if the owner is a forester 0.02 0.14
EDUC Binary variable = 1 if the owner has a level of edu-
cation equivalent or superior to Master’s degree
0.14 0.35
LORRAINE Binary variable = 1 if the forest is in the adminis-
trative region Lorraine
0.18 0.38
AUVERGNE Binary variable = 1 if the forest is in the adminis-
trative region Auvergne
0.17 0.38
PACA Binary variable = 1 if the forest is in the adminis-
trative region Provence-Alpes-Côte-d’Azur
0.14 0.35
PDL Binary variable = 1 if the forest is in the adminis-
trative region Pays de la Loire
0.28 0.45
BOURGOGNE Binary variable = 1 if the forest is in the adminis-
trative region Bourgogne
0.21 0.41
Wood production. The key variable HARVEST takes the value 1 if the owner has harvested
timber over the past five years and 0 otherwise. This is an accurate proxy for the harvesting process,
since a five-year period is long enough to capture any cause of harvesting timber. This is even more
true since forests are composed of uneven-age stands. We observe that 61% of the 324 French
private forest owners harvested timber over the past five years. The variable ENVIRON indicates
that only 8% of owners intend to perform work with their neighbors to protect the environment,
suggesting a low interest in environmental aspects. In addition, the average regional timber price is
55.28e. This corresponds to the average selling price of wood (roadside) by region of the National
Forests Office (Office National des Forêts). Finally, 22% of the forest owners interviewed report
having leisure activities in their forests (variable LEISURE), indicating that amenities are clearly
associated with forest management by these owners.
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Forest owners. The socio-demographic variables reveal that our database is composed of a ma-
jority of non-foresters, who are men, with an average age of 64 years, and a mean level of education
inferior to a Master’s degree. The variable BEQUEST underlines that 54% of the owners intends
to bequeath their forest.
Risk attitude is also an individual’s characteristic of the forest owner. Table 3 allows us to
observe the distribution of the forest owners among the 9 possible ranges of risk attitudes, from
high-risk prone (range 1) to extreme risk-aversion (range 9). Note that the extreme attitudes are
well-represented. Indeed, among the 82.7% of private forest owners that are risk averse, more than
40% belong to the higher range (extreme risk-aversion). In the same vein, among the 8.6% of the
sample that are risk-prone, more than 7% are in the lower range (high risk-prone attitude). In
addition, we can observe that 8.7% of the sample is characterized as risk neutral.
Table 3: Proportion of forest owners by CRRA ranges (in %)
CRRA ranges CRRA code Proportion of owners
r > 1.37 RA5 43.2
0.68 < r < 1.37 RA4 19.1
0.44 < r < 0.68 RA3 10.5
0.4 < r < 0.44 RA2 5.9
0.15 < r < 0.4 RA1 4
-0.13 < r < 0.15 RN 8.7
-0.47 < r < -0.13 RP1 0.9
-0.93 < r < -0.47 RP2 0.6
r < -0.93 RP3 7.1
3 Econometric model : a recursive bivariate ordered probit model
The harvesting decision is influenced by the forest owner’s risk aversion (Alvarez and Koskela [1];
Clarke and Reed [7]; Gong and Löfgren [14]; Uusivuori [34]) and the characteristics of the owner and
her/his property (Amacher et al. [2]; Garcia et al. [12]; Max and Lehman [27]). First, we cannot
exclude that risk aversion and the harvesting decision share common unobserved factors. Second, it
is unlikely that the harvesting decision directly modifies risk aversion, since the latter is an intrinsic
characteristic of the individual. Thus, we specify the following recursive bivariate ordered probit
model:
y∗1i = X
′
1iβ1 + 1i
y∗2i = X
′
2iβ2 + γy
∗
1i + 2i
(1)
where y∗1i stands for the relative risk aversion coefficient and y
∗
2i is the latent variable underlying
the harvesting decision y2i (y2i = 1 if the owner has harvested timber and 0 otherwise). X1 and X2
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correspond to the vectors of the explanatory variables of the relative risk aversion coefficient (y1i)
and the harvesting decision (y2i), respectively. We also assume that cov(1i, 2i) = ρ, which allows
us to take into account the potential endogeneity of risk aversion in the harvesting equation.
We define the empirical counterparts of the latent variables as:
y1i =

1 if y∗1i < c1
2 if c1 ≤ y∗1i < c2
...
J if cJ−1 ≤ y∗1i
(2)
and
y2i =
 0 if y∗2i < 01 if y∗2i ≥ 0 (3)
with c = [−0.93,−0.13, 0.15, 0.4, 0.44, 0.68, 1.37]. The cutoff, cj , are known and will therefore not
be estimated. Following Sajaia [32], we show that:
Pr(y1i = j, y2i = 0) = Pr(y
∗
1i < cj , y
∗
2i < 0)− Pr(y∗1i < cj−1, y∗2i < 0) (4)
and
Pr(y1i = j, y2i = 1) = Pr(y
∗
1i < cj)− Pr(y∗1i < cj−1)− Pr(y∗1i < cj , y∗2i < 0)
+Pr(y∗1i < cj−1, y
∗
2i < 0)
(5)
The equation system (1) can be estimated by the maximum likelihood method. Indeed, we
assume that (1i, 2i) ∼ N(0,Ω) with Ω =
 1 ρ
ρ 1
, thus we get:
Pr(y1i = j, y2i = 0) = Pr(1i < cj −X ′1iβ1, γ1i + 2i − γX
′
1iβ1 −X
′
2iβ2)
Pr(1i < cj−1 −X ′1iβ1, γ1i + 2i − γX
′
1iβ1 −X
′
2iβ2)
(6)
Given that
 1 0
γ 1
 1i
2i
 ∼ N
0,
 1 γ + ρ
γ + ρ γ2 + 2γρ+ 1
 we have:
Pr(y1i = j, y2i = 0) = Φ2(cj −X ′1iβ1, (−γX
′
1iβ1 −X
′
2iβ2)ζ, ρ˜)
−Φ2(cj−1 −X ′1iβ1, (−γX
′
1iβ1 −X
′
2iβ2)ζ, ρ˜)
(7)
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Similarly, we obtain:
Pr(y1i = j, y2i = 1) = Φ(cj −X ′1iβ1)− Φ(cj−1 −X
′
1iβ1)− Φ2(cj −X
′
1iβ1, (−γX
′
1iβ1 −X
′
2iβ2)ζ, ρ˜)
+Φ2(cj−1 −X ′1iβ1, (−γX
′
1iβ1 −X
′
2iβ2)ζ, ρ˜)
(8)
with ρ˜ = γ + ρ, ζ = (γ2 + 2γρ + 1)−1/2 and Φ and Φ2 the univariate and bivariate standard
cumulative distribution functions, respectively. If j = 1, then the probabilities above shrink to:
Pr(y1i = j, y2i = 0) = Φ2(cj −X ′1iβ1, (−γX
′
1iβ1 −X
′
2iβ2)ζ, ρ˜)
Pr(y1i = j, y2i = 1) = Φ(cj −X ′1iβ1)− Φ2(cj −X
′
1iβ1, (−γX
′
1iβ1 −X
′
2iβ2)ζ, ρ˜)
(9)
If j = J , then the probabilities above shrink to:
Pr(y1i = J, y2i = 0) = Φ((−γX ′1iβ1 −X
′
2iβ2)ζ)− Φ2(cj−1 −X
′
1iβ1, (−γX
′
1iβ1 −X
′
2iβ2)ζ, ρ˜)
Pr(y1i = J, y2i = 1) = 1− Φ(cj−1 −X ′1iβ1)− Φ(−γX
′
1iβ1 −X
′
2iβ2)ζ)+
Φ2(cj−1 −X ′1iβ1, (−γX
′
1iβ1 −X
′
2iβ2)ζ, ρ˜)
(10)
If we assume that the observations are independent, the log-likelihood function can be written
as follows:2
ln L =
N∑
i=1
K∑
k=1
J∑
j=1
I(y1i = j, y2i = k) lnPr(y1i = j, y2i = k) (11)
To identify the model parameters, it is necessary to impose an exclusion restriction on vectors
X1 and X2 (i.e. at least one element of X1 should not be present in X2). To do this, we exclude
in the equation of the harvesting decision the variable ENVIRON. Indeed, the owners who intend
to perform work with their neighbors to protect the environment are generally risk averse and
implement adaptation measures to protect themselves. These measures will have an effect on the
forest owner’s coefficient of relative risk aversion. However, this variable probably does not have a
direct effect on the harvesting decision.
4 Results
Our estimation results are presented in Table 4 for both the risk attitude and the harvesting decision.
Risk. The results displayed in Table 4 show that four variables seem to be determinant when
dealing with the risk attitudes of private forest owners. The first variable, ENVIRON, is positive
2The estimation is done using Matlab, the codes are available from the authors upon request.
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Table 4: Estimation results
RISK HARVESTING
Variable Estimate Std. Err. Estimate Std. Err.
RISK 0.4024∗∗ 0.1701
ENVIRON 1.6976∗∗∗ 0.3858
AREA 0.00005 0.0004 0.0058∗∗ 0.0024
PRICE 0.0076 0.0055 -0.0030 0.0067
FOREST-INCOME -0.0143∗∗ 0.0060 0.1020∗∗∗ 0.0310
GENDER 0.3356∗ 0.1872 -0.5922∗∗∗ 0.2257
AGE 0.0090∗ 0.0049 -0.0121∗ 0.0061
FORESTER 0.0311 0.3975 -0.1484 0.6319
LEISURE 0.0691 0.1765 0.2400 0.2007
BEQUEST 0.0539 0.1405 0.5003∗∗∗ 0.1703
DELEGATION 0.0884 0.2451 0.7316∗∗ 0.3368
EDUC -0.1555 0.1405 0.0655 0.1827
LORRAINE 0.0381 0.1737 0.1777 0.2035
ρ -0.1433 0.1940
Note: ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ for significance levels of 10, 5 and 1 per cent, respectively.
and significant at the 1% level. This means that the more the forest owner is concerned with
the environment the higher her/his risk aversion is. The second variable, FOREST-INCOME, is
negative and significant at 5%. In other words, the lower the percentage of forest income in the
total revenue of the forest owners, the higher the risk aversion. This result is not incompatible with
our initial assumption of CRRA, since we do not consider total wealth but only forest income. The
third and fourth variables, GENDER and AGE, concern the socio-demographic characteristics of
the forest owners. They are positive and significant at the 10% level. Women are associated with
higher risk aversion than men. This result is in line with the ones obtained in a myriad of contexts
from financial decisions to environmental issues to betting choices (Jianakoplos and Bernasek [19]).
In addition, we use the same procedure as Eckel and Grossman [11] to elicit risk attitude and we
find the same result regarding gender. Finally, our estimation results indicate that the older the
forest owner, the higher the risk aversion. This result is in accordance with the existing literature
in economics (Jianakoplos and Bernasek [19]), finance (Morin and Suarez [28]), and psychology
(Hunter and Kemp [16]). In other words, people become less risk prone and more cautious as they
get older. In addition, Mather et al. [26] confirm this result in the domain of gains, as in our
experiment.
Using the estimated parameters of the equation of risk aversion, we can calculate the predicted
value of the coefficient of the relative risk aversion of each owner and its average value in the
sample, i.e. E
(
y∗1i|X1i, β1 = βˆ1
)
= X
′
1iβˆ1. We obtain a value of 1.1527 (Std. Err. = 0.5526). To
our knowledge, this is the first time that such a coefficient has been estimated for private forest
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owners. Indeed, until now, the value was arbitrarily fixed and sensitivity analysis was performed
(see, for example, Brunette et al. [5]). Such an estimation may be very useful for calibrating the
model, taking into account forest owner’s risk aversion. In addition, this CRRA estimation for
French private forest owners is in accordance with Arrow [4], who indicated, in his seminal work,
that CRRA should be approximately 1. We may also compare our estimation with the existing ones,
especially for French farmers. Using the Eckel and Grossman procedure, Couture and Reynaud [9]
find a CRRA of 0.62 for French farmers.
Harvesting. Concerning the harvesting decision, several variables seem to be determinant. The
variable RISK affects the harvesting decision positively and significantly. This means that the higher
the risk aversion, the higher the probability of harvesting. This result is of particular interest because
it empirically confirms a result that is currently obtained only with a theoretical approach (Koskela
[21]). A higher probability of harvesting may be interpreted as a shorter rotation cycle or as a lower
density, due to higher thinning. Such risk management measures allow owners to reduce the risk
to the stand, so that risk-averse forest owners implemented them. Our result suggests that such
risk management measures are undertaken by the French private forest owners. This result also
takes part in the current debate about potential adaptation strategies to fight against the impact
of climate change. The favored strategies are the reduction of the rotation cycle and of the stand
density.
The variable AREA also affects the harvesting decision positively and significantly. The greater
the forest area, the greater the harvesting. This result is in line with Conway et al. [8], Stordal et
al. [33] and Garcia et al. [12] who suggested that large forest areas are more susceptible to being
used, in terms of the harvesting decision.
The variable FOREST-INCOME is positive and significant at 1%, suggesting that the higher the
percentage of forest income in the forest owner’s total wealth, the higher the probability to harvest.
This variable may be an indicator of the intensity of the forest owner’s management. Indeed, if the
percentage of forest income in the forest owner’s total wealth is high, this means that the forest
is managed so as to bring economic return and, thus, the higher this percentage, the higher the
frequency of harvesting. At the opposite end, if the percentage is low, then the forest’s management
is not really a main objective of the forest owner. This conclusion is in accordance with Garcia et
al. [12] and Stordal et al. [33], who indicated that when the percentage of non-forest income in the
forest owner’s total wealth is very high, they (non-industrial private forest owners particularly) can
afford to give up a part of their forest income in order to gain utility from non-timber benefits.
The results also indicate that being a woman (variable GENDER) has a negative and significant
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impact, suggesting that women forest owners harvest less often than men. This result is similar to
that obtained by Lidestav and Ekström [22]. According to these authors, this difference may be an
expression of differences in social and cultural aspects related to gender, such as education and the
division of labor in the family.
The variable AGE has a significant and negative effect on the probability to harvest. Stordal
et al. [33] also found a similar result and suggested that younger owners may have larger debt or
be facing large investments in the property, so that increased harvesting may give these owners
better liquidity. Another argument is that increasing age is found to decrease the owners’ technical
efficiency in timber production (Lien et al. [23]).
If a forest owner intends to bequeath her/his forest (BEQUEST), then she/he increases the har-
vesting decision. This means that the owners in our study seem to be more attached to bequeathing
the forest property than a large stock of timber (associated with a large level of non-timber benefits).
In our study, the variable LEISURE seems to have no effect on the harvesting decision. However,
as non-economic variables, such as gender, age, and intention to bequeath, significantly influence
the decision to harvest, we can say that the owners are not simple profit maximizers (industrial
owners). In addition, the variable LEISURE represents only a part of the existing amenity services
provided by forests, so that the forest owner may potentially have a preference for other amenities
like, for example, esthetical aspects. Finally, we analyze the effect of LEISURE on the probability
of harvesting while the relevant effect may be on the intensity of harvesting.
The fact of delegating the management of the forest (DELEGATION) to a professional has a
positive and significant effect on the harvesting decision. The underlying idea of delegated forest
management is to adopt best practices, allowing for better financial returns, such that the pro-
fessional is encouraged to harvest more. This result is also obtained by Garcia et al. [12] at the
regional level.
More surprisingly, the variable PRICE has a non-significant impact on the harvesting decision
and, in addition, the coefficient is negative. This result is similar to those obtained by Dennis [10]
(no significant effect) and Hyberg and Holthausen [17] (negative effect). According to these authors,
this result could be the consequence of trade-offs made by the owners between forest income (income
effect) and amenities (substitution effect). According to Provencher [31], this result could also be
explained by an expectation of rising prices, which pushes owners to postpone their harvests, despite
relatively high prices.
Finally, note that ρ, the correlation coefficient of the two error terms, is not significant. This
suggests that the endogeneity of risk aversion is irrelevant in the harvesting equation.
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5 Discussion and conclusion
France has decided to increase harvesting in its forests by 21 million cubic meters until 2020. Al-
though IGN [18] proved this increase as feasible, the French private forest owners will have to provide
the largest effort, as they own around 75% of the forest surface. Therefore, the decision-maker needs
to know the relevant levers at their disposal in order to increase the harvesting decision in France.
Our study presents important results in this direction. Indeed, the analysis of the determinants
of the harvesting decision reveals a positive effect of some variables, displaying several interesting
levers for the decision-maker. Thus, the forest owner’s risk aversion, the forest surface, the portion
of forest income in the total patrimony, the willingness to bequeath and the fact of delegating forest
management to a professional all increase the harvesting decision. Consequently, various approaches
may be prioritized by the decision-maker. First, the decision-maker may fight against fragmentation
by encouraging the forest owners to group together, for example within cooperatives. Second, the
decision-maker may encourage forest investment, in order to increase the portion of the forest income
in the total wealth of the forest owner. For instance, the decision-maker may adopt a favorable tax
system. Third, the decision-maker may encourage bequests through favorable bequest conditions,
especially in terms of succession. This would also reduce the average age of owners and thereby
increase harvesting. Indeed, age negatively influences the harvest decision. Finally, delegation of
forest management should be encouraged in order to increase the harvesting decision. This lever
may be linked directly to the first one. Indeed, if the private forest owners regroup their forests into
cooperatives, for example, then it will be easier and cheaper to delegate forest management.
In addition, in a context of climate change where uncertainty characterizes the forest owner’s
environment, dealing with the harvesting decision without considering risk attitude brings only
partial information. Indeed, we have known for a long time now that forest owner’s risk aversion
plays an important role in the harvesting decision. However, the forest owner’s risk aversion is not
unanimous from an empirical point of view (Lönnstedt and Svensson [25]; Andersson and Gong [3];
Brunette et al. [5]) and, importantly, this risk aversion is poorly known. On these last points, our
study delivers interesting results. First, we found that French private forest owners are clearly risk
averse, adding our point of view to the debate. Second, we quantify this risk aversion through a
relative risk aversion coefficient of 1.15. This estimation may be very useful for further researches,
as it allows to parameter forest owner’s risk aversion in a simple manner.
15
References
[1] L.H.R. Alvarez and E. Koskela. Does risk aversion accelerate optimal forest rotation under
uncertainty? Journal of Forest Economics, 12:171–184, 2006.
[2] G. Amacher, C. Conway, and J. Sullivan. Econometric analysis of forest landowners: is there
anything left to study? Journal of Forest Economics, 9(2):137–164, 2003.
[3] M. Andersson and P. Gong. Risk preferences, risk perceptions and timber harvest decisions
- an empirical study of nonindustrial private forest owners in northern sweden. Forest Policy
and Economics, 12:330–339, 2010.
[4] K.J. Arrow. Essays in the theory of risk-bearing. North-Holland, Amsterdam, 1970.
[5] M. Brunette, S. Couture, and J. Laye. Optimizing forest management when storms have an
impact on both production and price: a markov decision process approach. Cahiers du LEF,
2012-03:http://www6.nancy.inra.fr/lef/Cahiers–du–LEF/2012/2012–03, 2012.
[6] C. Camerer and R. Hogarth. The effects of financial incentives in experiments: A review and
capital-labor-production framework. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 1(19):7–42, 1999.
[7] H.R. Clarke and W.J. Reed. The trre-cutting problem in a stochastic environment: the case
of age-dependent growth. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Controls, 13:569–595, 1989.
[8] C. Conway, G.S. Amacher, S. Sullivan, and D. Wear. Decisions non-industrial forest landowners
make: an empirical examination. Journal of Forest Economics, 9(3):181–203, 2003.
[9] S. Couture and A. Reynaud. Stability of risk preference measures: results from a field experi-
ment on french farmers. Theory and Decision, 73:203–221, 2012.
[10] Donald F. Dennis. A probit analysis of the harvest decision using pooled time-series and cross-
sectional data. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 18(2):176–187, March
1990.
[11] C.C. Eckel and P.J. Grossman. Forecasting risk attitudes: An experimental study using actual
and forecast gamble choices. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 68(1):1–7, 2008.
[12] S. Garcia, N. E. Kéré, and A. Stenger. Econometric analysis of social interactions in the
production decisions of private forest owners. forthcoming in European Review of Agricultural
Economics, 2014.
16
[13] C. Gollier. The economics of risk and time. The MIT Press, Cambridge, page 445p, 2001.
[14] P. Gong and K.G. Löfgren. Risk-aversion and the short-run supply of timber. Forest Science,
49(5):647–656, 2003.
[15] C.A. Holt and S.K. Laury. Risk aversion and incentive effects. The American Economic Review,
92(5):1644–1655, 2002.
[16] K. Hunter and S. Kemp. The personality of e-commerce investors. Journal of Economic
Psychology, 25(5):529–537, 2004.
[17] B. Hyberg and D. Holthausen. The behavior of nonindustrial private forest owners. Canadian
Journal of Forest Research, 15:1014–1023, 1989.
[18] IGN. La forêt en chiffres et en cartes. IGN, 2012.
[19] N.A. Jianakoplos and A. Bernasek. Financial risk taking by age and birth cohort. Southern
Economic Journal, 72:981–1001, 2006.
[20] J. Kangas. Incorporating risk attitude into comparison of reforestation alternatives. Scandina-
vian Journal of Forest Research, 9:297–304, 1994.
[21] E. Koskela. Forest taxation and timber supply under price uncertainty: Perfect capital markets.
Forest Science, 35:137–159, 1989.
[22] G. Lidestav and M. Ekström. Introducing gender in studies on management behaviour among
non-industrial private forest owners. Scandinavian Journal of Forest Research, 15(3):378–386,
2000.
[23] G. Lien, S. Størdal, and S. Baardsen. Technical efficiency in timber production and effects of
other income sources. Small-scale Forestry, 6(1):12, 2007.
[24] G. Lien, S. Størdal, J.B. Hardaker, and L.J. Asheim. Risk aversion and optimal forest replanting
: a stochastic efficiency study. European Journal of Operational Research, 181:1584–1592, 2007.
[25] L. Lönnstedt and J. Svensson. Non-industrial private forest owner’s risk preferences. Scandi-
navian Journal of Forest Research, 15(6):651–660, 2000.
[26] M. Mather, N. Mazar, M.A. Gorlick, N.R. Lighthall, J. Burgeno, A. Schoeke, and D. Ariely.
Risk preferences and aging: The “certainty effect” in older adults’ decision making. Psychology
and Aging, 2012.
17
[27] W. Max and D. E. Lehman. A behavioral model of timber supply. Journal of Environmental
Economics and Management, 15(1):71–86, March 1988.
[28] R.A. Morin and A.F. Suarez. Risk aversion revisited. Journal of Finance, 38:1201–1216, 1983.
[29] S.K. Pattanayak, K.L. Abt, and T.P. Holmes. Timber and amenities on non-industrial private
forest land. In: E. O. Sills and K. L. Abt (eds), Forests in a Market Economy. Dordrecht;
Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers, pages 243–258, 2003.
[30] S.K. Pattanayak, B. Murray, and R. Abt. How joint is joint forest production? an econometric
analysis of timber supply conditional on endogenous amenity values. Forest Science, 48(3):479–
491, 2002.
[31] B. Provencher. Structural versus reduced-form estimation of optimal stopping problems. Amer-
ican Journal of Agricultural Economics, 79(2):357–368, 1997.
[32] Z. Sajaia. Maximum likelihood estimation of a bivariate ordered probit model: implementation
and monte carlo simulations. The Stata Journal, Forthcoming, 2008.
[33] S. Størdal, G. Lien, and S. Baardsen. Analyzing determinants of forest owners’ decision-making
using a sample selection framework. Journal of Forest Economics, 14:159–176, 2008.
[34] J. Uusivuori. Non-constant risk attitudes and timber harvesting. Forest Science, 48:459–470,
2002.
18
